Inferring preferences from choices under uncertainty

Arbeitspapier

If a decision maker, in a world of uncertainty à la Anscombe and Aumann (1963), can choose acts according to some objective probability distribution (by throwing dice for instance) from any given set of acts, then there is no set of acts that allows an experimenter to test more than the Axiom of EUOL (that the DM evaluates objective lotteries with an expected utility function). In fact there is no (common) experimental design that allows an experimenter to test more than EUOL. For any decision problem (or set of decision problems), for any preference relation that satisfies the Axiom EUOL, and for any optimal choice (or collection of choices) given this preference relation, there is another preference relation that satisfies EUOL plus the Savage axioms, for which this choice is also optimal.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers ; No. 462

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access ; Design of Experiments: General ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
• Subject: ambiguity ; decision theory ; Knightian uncertainty ; experiments ; Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit ; Erwartungsnutzen ; Präferenztheorie ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kuzmics, Christoph
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
• (where): Bielefeld
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81099
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-26717256
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET