A Perfect Marriage: Child-related Pensions and Public Education

Arbeitspapier

In the present paper the effects of different pay-as-you-go pension systems on fertility decisions of a representative household are examined. Thereby, the analysis focuses especially on the interplay of parental quantity and quality decisions, introduced by Becker (1960). As it will be shown, a traditional pay-as-you-go system in either case distorts decisions of parents leading to an erosion of the financial basis of the system. In contrast, the assessment of a child-related pay-as-you-go system is ambiguous. If parents are solely responsible for expenditures on the quality of children, it is inefficient, too. However, if it is combined with a device like public education, optimality can be restored.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Otto-Wolff-Discussion Paper ; No. 2004,02

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Household Behavior: General ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Education and Research Institutions: General
• Subject: Pay-as-you-go ; child-related pension ; quantity and quality of children ; Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung ; Umlageverfahren ; Familienleistungsausgleich ; Bildungsinvestition ; Bildungspolitik ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Voigtländer, Michael
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung (owiwo)
• (where): Köln
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23835
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET