Arbeitspapier
Efficiency and the Provision of Open Platforms
Private firms may not have efficient incentives to allow third-party producers to access their platform or develop extensions for their products. Based on a two-sided market model, I discuss two reasons for why. First, a private firm may not be able to internalize all benefits from cross-group externalities arising with third-party extensions. Second, firms may have strategic incentives to shut out third-parties because it relaxes competition.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 748
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
- Subject
-
Platforms
Two-sided Markets
Open versus Closed
Software
Marktstruktur
Internetbasierter Dienst
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Tåg, Joacim
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
- (where)
-
Stockholm
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Tåg, Joacim
- Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Time of origin
- 2008
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