Arbeitspapier

Efficiency and the Provision of Open Platforms

Private firms may not have efficient incentives to allow third-party producers to access their platform or develop extensions for their products. Based on a two-sided market model, I discuss two reasons for why. First, a private firm may not be able to internalize all benefits from cross-group externalities arising with third-party extensions. Second, firms may have strategic incentives to shut out third-parties because it relaxes competition.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 748

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Thema
Platforms
Two-sided Markets
Open versus Closed
Software
Marktstruktur
Internetbasierter Dienst
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Tåg, Joacim
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Tåg, Joacim
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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