Arbeitspapier
Markets and cooperation
Why do money and markets crowd out co-operative relations? This paper characterises the effects of intertemporal preferences, money, and markets on players' ability to co-operate in material-payoff supergames. Players' aversion to intertemporal substitution facilitates co-operation by decreasing their evaluation of short-run gains from deviations and increasing that of losses from punishments. Goods' markets and money may hinder co-operation by allowing players to reallocate short-run gains from deviations in time, at some cost. Allowing for free intertemporal reallocation of payoffs, perfect financial markets always make co-operation harder. Financial markets' imperfections facilitate co-operation by opposing this effect.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 100.1999
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Exchange and Production Economies
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- Thema
-
Co-operation
repeated games
Prisoner's dilemma
commons
reciprocal exchange
implicit contracts
collusion
institutions
Marktmechanismus
Kooperation
Spieltheorie
Finanzmarkt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Spagnolo, Giancarlo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 1999