Arbeitspapier

Markets and cooperation

Why do money and markets crowd out co-operative relations? This paper characterises the effects of intertemporal preferences, money, and markets on players' ability to co-operate in material-payoff supergames. Players' aversion to intertemporal substitution facilitates co-operation by decreasing their evaluation of short-run gains from deviations and increasing that of losses from punishments. Goods' markets and money may hinder co-operation by allowing players to reallocate short-run gains from deviations in time, at some cost. Allowing for free intertemporal reallocation of payoffs, perfect financial markets always make co-operation harder. Financial markets' imperfections facilitate co-operation by opposing this effect.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 100.1999

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Exchange and Production Economies
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Thema
Co-operation
repeated games
Prisoner's dilemma
commons
reciprocal exchange
implicit contracts
collusion
institutions
Marktmechanismus
Kooperation
Spieltheorie
Finanzmarkt
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Spagnolo, Giancarlo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
1999

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Spagnolo, Giancarlo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 1999

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