Board monitoring, regulation and performance in the banking industry: evidence from the market for corporate control

Abstract: Research Question/Issue: The specific monitoring effect of boards of directors versus industry regulation is unclear. In this paper, we examine how the interaction between bank-level monitoring and regulatory regimes influences the announcement period returns of acquiring banks in the US and twelve European economies. Research Findings: We study three board monitoring mechanisms (independence, CEO-chair duality and diversity) and analyze their effectiveness in preventing underperforming merger strategies under bank regulators of varying strictness. Only under strict banking regulation regimes, board independence and diversity improve acquisition performance. In less strict regulatory environments, corporate governance is virtually irrelevant in improving the performance outcomes of merger activities. Theoretical Implications: Our results indicate a complementary role between monitoring by boards and bank regulation. This study is the first to report evidence consistent with complem

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Postprint ; begutachtet (peer reviewed) ; In: Corporate Governance: An International Review ; 18 (2010) 5 ; 381-395

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2010
• Creator: Hagendorff, Jens ; Collins, Michael ; Keasey, Kevin

Further information

• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00815.x
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-262655
• Rights: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 25.03.2025, 1:50 PM CET