Arbeitspapier

On the role of budgeting in the delegated provision of public goods under asymmetric information

The present paper investigates the neglected topic of budgeting rules for public bureaucracies performing governmental activities within predetermined budgets under rules governing expenditure levels and composition. We analyze the optimal budgeting scheme, if the bureaucracy has superior information vis – vis the policymaker. It is tasked with supplying different types of public goods and is subject to costly audits. The optimal budgeting scheme for the bureaucracy is determined. It is shown that it crucially depends on the level of auditing costs. The same holds for the extent of discretion given to the bureaucracy about levels and composition of public expenditures.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers ; No. 51

Classification
Wirtschaft
National Budget; Budget Systems
Public Goods
Subject
Öffentliche Finanzplanung
Bürokratietheorie
Öffentliches Gut
Asymmetrische Information
Öffentliche Finanzkontrolle
Kosten
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Krause, Günter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Würzburg, Department of Economics
(where)
Würzburg
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Krause, Günter
  • University of Würzburg, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2004

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