Arbeitspapier
Econometric analysis of games with multiple equilibria
This article reviews the recent literature on the econometric analysis of games where multiple solutions are possible. Multiplicity does not necessarily preclude the estimation of a particular model (and in certain cases even improves its identification), but ignoring it can lead to misspecifications. The survey starts with a general characterization of structural models that highlights how multiplicity a.ects the classical paradigm. Because the information structure is an important guide to identification and estimation strategies, I discuss games of complete and incomplete information separately. Whereas many of the techniques discussed in the article can be transported across different information environments, some of them are specific to particular models. I also survey models of social interactions in a di.erent section. I close with a brief discussion of post-estimation issues and research prospects.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: cemmap working paper ; No. CWP29/12
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Identification
multiplicity
games
social interactions
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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de Paula, Áureo
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap)
- (where)
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London
- (when)
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2012
- DOI
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doi:10.1920/wp.cem.2012.2912
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- de Paula, Áureo
- Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap)
Time of origin
- 2012
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