Arbeitspapier
Bank and sovereign debt risk connection
Euro area data show a positive connection between sovereign and bank risk, which increases with banks' and sovereign long run fragility. We build a macro model with banks subject to moral hazard and liquidity risk (sudden deposit withdrawals): banks invest in risky government bonds as a form of capital buffer against liquidity risk. The model can replicate the positive connection between sovereign and bank risk observed in the data. Central bank liquidity policy, through full allotment policy, is successful in stabilizing the spiraling feedback loops between bank and sovereign risk.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 7
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
liquidity risk
sovereign risk
capital regulations
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Darracq Pariès, Matthieu
Faia, Ester
Rodriguez Palenzuela, Diego
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
- (wo)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2228494
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Darracq Pariès, Matthieu
- Faia, Ester
- Rodriguez Palenzuela, Diego
- Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
Entstanden
- 2013