Arbeitspapier

Political connections and depositor discipline

We examine the effects of political connections on depositor discipline in a sample of Turkish banks. Banks with former members of parliament at the helm enjoy reduced depositor discipline, especially if the former politician's party is currently in power - less so if the former politician served as a minister. Banks with structural problems are more likely to appoint former politicians, but our results remain robust after controlling for selection effects. Ministers may reduce depositor discipline less because they signal severe problems and because the additional government deposits they bring to the bank during their term tend to leave with them.

ISBN
978-952-6699-05-9
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: BOFIT Discussion Papers ; No. 6/2013

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Depositor discipline
political connections
banks

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Disli, Mustafa
Schoors, Koen
Meir, Jos
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
(where)
Helsinki
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Disli, Mustafa
  • Schoors, Koen
  • Meir, Jos
  • Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)

Time of origin

  • 2013

Other Objects (12)