Arbeitspapier
Talent discovery, layoff risk and unemployment insurance
In talent-intensive jobs, workers' quality is revealed by their performance. This enhances productivity and earnings, but also increases layoff risk. Firms cannot insure workers against this risk if they compete fiercely for talent. In this case, the more risk-averse workers will choose less quality-revealing jobs. This lowers expected productivity and salaries. Public unemployment insurance corrects this inefficiency, enhancing employment in talent-sensitive industries, consistently with international evidence. Unemployment insurance dominates legal restrictions on firms' dismissals, which penalize more talent-sensitive firms and thus depress expected productivity. Finally, unemployment insurance fosters education, by encouraging investment in risky human capital that enhances talent discovery.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CFS Working Paper Series ; No. 603
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Education and Research Institutions: General
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- Subject
-
talent
learning
layoff risk
unemployment insurance
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Pagano, Marco
Picariello, Luca
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
- (where)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-473902
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Pagano, Marco
- Picariello, Luca
- Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Time of origin
- 2018