Arbeitspapier

Same-sex marriage, the great equalizer

When limited to heterosexual marriage, agents of different genders are not guaranteed to harvest the same payoff even conditional on having the same type, even if all other factors, such as search costs or the distribution of partner types, are same across genders. If same-sex marriage is legalized and there is a positive mass of agents who find marriage with both sexes acceptable, then only symmetric equilibria survive in symmetric environments.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2019/2

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Subject
marriage markets
matching
gender equality
same-sex marriage

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Parakhonyak, Alexey
Popov, Sergey V.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(where)
Cardiff
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Parakhonyak, Alexey
  • Popov, Sergey V.
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Time of origin

  • 2019

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