Arbeitspapier
Same-sex marriage, the great equalizer
When limited to heterosexual marriage, agents of different genders are not guaranteed to harvest the same payoff even conditional on having the same type, even if all other factors, such as search costs or the distribution of partner types, are same across genders. If same-sex marriage is legalized and there is a positive mass of agents who find marriage with both sexes acceptable, then only symmetric equilibria survive in symmetric environments.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2019/2
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Subject
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marriage markets
matching
gender equality
same-sex marriage
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Parakhonyak, Alexey
Popov, Sergey V.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
- (where)
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Cardiff
- (when)
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2019
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Parakhonyak, Alexey
- Popov, Sergey V.
- Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
Time of origin
- 2019