Arbeitspapier

What Are the Gains from Pension Reform?

This paper presents a unified analytical framework for the analysis of social security reform. It discusses reform along two dimensions: Pay-As-You-Go versus fully funded on the one hand, and actuarial versus non-actuarial on the other. Making the system more actuarial entails a trade-off between less distorted work incentives and intra-generational redistribution. Increasing the degree of funding entails a trade-off between more distorted work incentives, and redistribution in favor of future generations. If a PAYGO system already has strong actuarial elements, the additional welfare gain from making it fully funded derives from the possibility of portfolio diversification.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 535

Classification
Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Subject
Pension reform
social security
funded pensions
work incentives
saving
Rentenreform
Umlageverfahren
Rentenfinanzierung
Kapitaldeckungsverfahren
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lindbeck, Assar
Persson, Mats
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
(where)
Stockholm
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lindbeck, Assar
  • Persson, Mats
  • The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)

Time of origin

  • 2000

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