Complex pricing and consumer-side attention

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes a market in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete by setting menus of two-part tariffs, and in which some consumers are not informed about the linear per-unit price component. We consider two regulatory interventions that limit firms' ability to price discriminate: (i) diminishing the range of contracts via a reduction in the number of two-part tariffs offered (which prohibits inter-group price discrimination), and (ii) a reduction in tariff complexity via the abolishment of linear fees (which prohibits inter- and intra-group price discrimination). We characterize the effects of these interventions on firm profits and (informed and uninformed) consumer welfare, and identify conditions for the optimal policy. Our results provide insights for the evaluation of recent policy interventions (e.g., the regulation of roaming charges in the EU market).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 20-075

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
• Thema: Two-part tariffs ; Consumer attention ; Policy intervention

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fischer, Christian ; Rasch, Alexander ; Wenzel, Tobias
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
• (wo): Mannheim
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/227626
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ