Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment

Arbeitspapier

This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of unannounced, public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers. Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase. Our results are consistent with workers having a preference for conformity and being reciprocal at the same time.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8311

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Field Experiments ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Subject: employee motivation ; recognition ; reciprocity ; conformity ; field experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bradler, Christiane ; Dur, Robert ; Neckermann, Susanne ; Non, Arjan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101910
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET