When and how the punishment must fit the crime

Arbeitspapier

In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu,1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator, but also to the nature of the deviation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 15-04

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Subject: Simple Penal Code ; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ; Repeated Extensive Game ; Optimal Punishment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Mailath, George J. ; Nocke, Volker ; White, Lucy
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129586
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-374834
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:47 AM CET