Arbeitspapier
An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures
Models of government formation processes in multi-party democracies are unusually highly sensitive to the rules that govern the selection of formateurs. The formal literature has exclusively focused on two selection rules: selection proportional to seat share (Baron and Ferejohn 1989), and selection in order of seat share (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988). In this paper we use a new data set on government formation attempts in 12 multi-party democracies to empirically assess which selection rule most closely approximates the data. We find that while there is no empirical support for selection in order of seat share, proportional selection may serve as a good first approximation. However, our results also indicate that formateur selection exhibits a significant incumbency effect: ceteris paribus, the former prime minister's party is more likely to be selected to attempt the formation of the next government.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1267
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Diermeier, Daniel
Merlo, Antoni
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
-
Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
1999
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Diermeier, Daniel
- Merlo, Antoni
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1999
Other Objects (12)
Uncertainty, bargaining power and bargaining solutions: An empirical application
Plea bargaining procedures worldwide: Drivers of introduction and use
Central bank independence and wage bargaining structure: Empirical evidence
Empirical analysis of countervailing power in business-to-business bargaining
Bargaining
Price and Quantity Measurements: Theoretical Biases in Empirical Procedures
Creditor concentration: an empirical investigation
A note on the impact of procedures in strike models: The case of bargaining structure
Learning from a piece of pie: the empirical content of Nash bargaining
Organizational bargaining
Farm Bargaining
Mysterious Bargaining
Uncertainty, bargaining power and bargaining solutions: An empirical application
Plea bargaining procedures worldwide: Drivers of introduction and use
Central bank independence and wage bargaining structure: Empirical evidence
Empirical analysis of countervailing power in business-to-business bargaining
Bargaining
Price and Quantity Measurements: Theoretical Biases in Empirical Procedures
Creditor concentration: an empirical investigation
A note on the impact of procedures in strike models: The case of bargaining structure
Learning from a piece of pie: the empirical content of Nash bargaining
Organizational bargaining
Farm Bargaining
Mysterious Bargaining
Uncertainty, bargaining power and bargaining solutions: An empirical application
Plea bargaining procedures worldwide: Drivers of introduction and use
Central bank independence and wage bargaining structure: Empirical evidence
Empirical analysis of countervailing power in business-to-business bargaining
Bargaining
Price and Quantity Measurements: Theoretical Biases in Empirical Procedures
Creditor concentration: an empirical investigation
A note on the impact of procedures in strike models: The case of bargaining structure
Learning from a piece of pie: the empirical content of Nash bargaining
Organizational bargaining
Farm Bargaining