Arbeitspapier
Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration
In a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, we introduce the concept of an intertemporal Cournot equilibrium. We show that if the number of strategic agents increases without limit, the intertemporal Cournot equilibrium converges to the intertemporal Walras equilibrium only when the tune horizon for the agent is finite. If the time horizon is infinite, each strategic agent is able to exert nonnegligible market power, no matter how large their number is.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 193
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Cordella, Tito
Datta, Manjira
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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1994
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5133
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cordella, Tito
- Datta, Manjira
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 1994
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Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions for Games with Differential Information
Nash's interpretations of equilibrium: Solving the objections to Cournot
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On the Endogenous Choice of Bertrand Vs. Cournot Equilibrium in a Duopoly
Cournot fire sales
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Communication in Cournot oligopoly
Subjective intertemporal substitution
Intertemporal discrete choice