Universal Banks, Corporate Control, and Equity Carve-Outs in Germany

Artikel

Universal Banks, Corporate Control, and Equity Carve-Outs in Germany This paper analyzes value effects of changes in the governance structure of German firms due to equity carve-outs. Our main conjecture is that the degree of pre-event corporate control affects market reactions to the announcement of carve-outs. We test two contradictory implications. If less control of management leads to less efficiently managed firms, in particular these firms will benefit the most from a change in the governance structure. On the other hand, if tight control of management ensures a more efficient use of the carve-out proceeds, firms more subject to corporate control will have higher abnormal returns. Our evidence clearly supports the first prediction. We find that a higher degree of pre-event ownership concentration leads to lower abnormal returns. We find evidence consistent with an active role of banks in disciplining management, but this does not go beyond what non-financial blockholders achieve, although we explicitly take into account direct equity stakes, proxy-voting rights, and supervisory board representation of banks. (JEL G21, G32)

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Kredit und Kapital ; ISSN: 1865-5734 ; Volume: 41 ; Year: 2008 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 557-587

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Elsas, Ralf ; Löffler, Yvonne
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Duncker & Humblot
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3790/kuk.41.4.557
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ