Arbeitspapier

Term limits: do they really affect fiscal policy choices?

According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2199

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policy
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Thema
term limits
comparative politics
fiscal policy
Finanzpolitik
Regelgebundene Politik
Öffentliche Schulden
Systemvergleich
Schätzung
USA
Welt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dalle Nogare, Chiara
Ricciuti, Roberto
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dalle Nogare, Chiara
  • Ricciuti, Roberto
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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