Arbeitspapier
Term limits: do they really affect fiscal policy choices?
According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2199
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policy
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
- Thema
-
term limits
comparative politics
fiscal policy
Finanzpolitik
Regelgebundene Politik
Öffentliche Schulden
Systemvergleich
Schätzung
USA
Welt
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dalle Nogare, Chiara
Ricciuti, Roberto
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dalle Nogare, Chiara
- Ricciuti, Roberto
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2008