Optimal kidney exchange with immunosuppressants

Arbeitspapier

Potent immunosuppressant drugs suppress the body's ability to reject a transplanted organ up to the point that a transplant across blood- or tissue-type incompatibility becomes possible. In contrast to the standard kidney exchange problem, our setting also involves the decision about which patients receive from the limited supply of immunosuppressants that make them compatible with originally incompatible kidneys. We firstly present a general computational framework to model this problem. Our main contribution is a range of efficient algorithms that provide flexibility in terms of meeting meaningful objectives. We also show that these algorithms satisfy desirable axiomatic and strategic properties.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2019/15

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Subject: kidney exchange ; immunosuppressant drugs ; matching ; complexity

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Aziz, Haris ; Cseh, Ágnes
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
• (where): Budapest
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/222062
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET