Arbeitspapier

Spin doctors: An experiment on vague disclosure

Unfavorable news are often delivered under the disguise of vagueness. Our theory-driven laboratory experiment investigates this strategic use of vagueness in voluntary disclosure and asks whether there is scope for policy to improve information transmission. We find that vagueness is profitably deployed by senders to fool those receivers that lack strategic sophistication. Imposing precise disclosure leads to more easily interpretable messages, but results in fewer sender types disclosing at all. Since non- disclosure also systematically misleads naive receivers, the welfare implications of imposing precision are not obvious. However, our model and experiment show that information transmission and the welfare of naive receivers are improved by policies that impose precision. Our results speak to the rules governing firms' disclosure of quality-relevant information, the disclosure of research findings, and testimonies in a court of law.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 304

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation
Thema
communication
naivete
flexibility
regulation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Deversi, Marvin
Ispano, Alessandro
Schwardmann, Peter
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
(wo)
München und Berlin
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Deversi, Marvin
  • Ispano, Alessandro
  • Schwardmann, Peter
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition

Entstanden

  • 2022

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