Arbeitspapier
The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 342
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Labor Discrimination
- Subject
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Adverse selection
statistical discrimination
stochastic order relation
Adverse Selection
Agency Theory
Leistungsanreiz
Anreizvertrag
Arbeitsproduktivität
Stochastischer Prozess
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schnedler, Wendelin
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schnedler, Wendelin
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2001