Arbeitspapier

The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models

A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 342

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Labor Discrimination
Subject
Adverse selection
statistical discrimination
stochastic order relation
Adverse Selection
Agency Theory
Leistungsanreiz
Anreizvertrag
Arbeitsproduktivität
Stochastischer Prozess
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schnedler, Wendelin
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schnedler, Wendelin
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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