On the Foundations of the Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Cooperative Investments and Message-Dependent Contracts

Arbeitspapier

The property-rights theory assumes that trade is non-contractible ex-ante and focusses exclusively on the allocation of property-rights. We derive foundations for this focus on property-rights by identifying scenarios where only one of the simple ownership structures is optimal even though trade is contractible. In these scenarios it is optimal: (1) not to sign a trade contract; (2a) to sign a partially enforced trade contract; (2b) such a combination of asset ownership and a trade contract might even achieve the first-best. For the purpose of identifying the optimal simple ownership structure, trade contracts can be neclected in scenarios (2a) and (2b).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 12/2000

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Firm Organization and Market Structure
• Thema: Incomplete Contracts ; Property Rights ; Specific Investments

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Roider, Andreas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2000

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78395
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ