Arbeitspapier

Capacity Rights and Full Cost Transfer Pricing

This paper examines the theoretical properties of full cost transfer prices in multi-divisional firms. In our model, divisional managers are responsible for the initial acquisition of productive capacity and the utilization of that capacity in subsequent periods, once operational uncertainty has been resolved. We examine alternative variants of full cost transfer pricing with the property that the discounted sum of transfer payments is equal to the initial capacity acquisition cost and the present value of all subsequent variable costs of output supplied to a division. Our analysis identifies environments where particular variants of full cost transfer pricing induce efficiency in both the initial investments and the subsequent output levels. Our findings highlight the need for a proper integration of intracompany pricing rules and divisional control rights over capacity assets.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7968

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dutta, Sunil
Reichelstein, Stefan J.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dutta, Sunil
  • Reichelstein, Stefan J.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2019

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