Arbeitspapier

Characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents

We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 769

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subject
strategy-proofness
several infinitely divisible commodities
uniform rule
separable preferences
Güter
Allokation
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Neue politische Ökonomie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Morimoto, Shuhei
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Ching, Stephen
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(where)
Osaka
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Morimoto, Shuhei
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
  • Ching, Stephen
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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