Arbeitspapier
Characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 769
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
-
strategy-proofness
several infinitely divisible commodities
uniform rule
separable preferences
Güter
Allokation
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Neue politische Ökonomie
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Morimoto, Shuhei
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Ching, Stephen
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (where)
-
Osaka
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Morimoto, Shuhei
- Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Ching, Stephen
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Time of origin
- 2010