Arbeitspapier

How does risk flow in the credit default swap market?

We develop a framework to analyse the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market as a network of risk transfers among counterparties. From a theoretical perspective, we introduce the notion of flow-of-risk and provide sufficient conditions for a bow-tie network architecture to endogenously emerge as a result of intermediation. This architecture shows three distinct sets of counterparties: i) Ultimate Risk Sellers (URS), ii) Dealers (indirectly connected to each other), iii) Ultimate Risk Buyers (URB). We show that the probability of widespread distress due to counterparty risk is higher in a bow-tie architecture than in more fragmented network structures. Empirically, we analyse a unique global dataset of bilateral CDS exposures on major sovereign and financial reference entities in 2011-2014. We find the presence of a bow-tie network architecture consistently across both reference entities and time, and thatt the flow-of-risk originates from a large number of URSs (e.g. hedge funds) and ends up in a few leading URBs, most of which are non-banks (in particular asset managers). Finally, the analysis of the CDS portfolio composition of the URBs shows a high level of concentration: in particular, the top URBs often show large exposures to potentially correlated reference entities.

ISBN
978-92-95081-68-0
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ESRB Working Paper Series ; No. 33

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
International Financial Markets
Thema
flow-of-risk
systemic risk
credit default swap
financial networks
network architecture

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
D'Errico, Marco
Battiston, Stefano
Peltonen, Tuomas
Scheicher, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.2849/442449
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • D'Errico, Marco
  • Battiston, Stefano
  • Peltonen, Tuomas
  • Scheicher, Martin
  • European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision

Entstanden

  • 2016

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