Arbeitspapier

The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective

This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1906

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
minimum wage
labor market
employment
unemployment
job offer
job acceptance

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Brown, Alessio J. G.
Merkl, Christian
Snower, Dennis J.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(where)
Kiel
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Brown, Alessio J. G.
  • Merkl, Christian
  • Snower, Dennis J.
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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