Arbeitspapier

Hotelling competition with multi-purchasing: Time Magazine, Newsweek, or both?

Equilibrium prices behave quite differently if consumers single-purchase (buy either Time Magazine or Newsweek) or if some consumers multi-purchase (buy both). Prices are strategic complements under single-purchase, and increase with magazine quality. In a multi-purchase regime prices are strategically independent because firms then act monopolistically by pricing the incremental benefit to marginal consumers. Furthermore, prices can decrease with magazine quality due to overlapping content. Higher preference heterogeneity increases prices and profits in equilibrium with single-purchase, but decreases them with multi-purchase. We determine when each regime holds, and present a detailed reaction function analysis which applies more generally to duopoly pricing.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3096

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
magazine competition
multi-purchase
incremental pricing
content competition
Zeitschrift
Preiswettbewerb
Hotelling Modell
Konsumentenverhalten
Produktdifferenzierung
Produktsubstitution
Duopol
Reaktionsfunktion
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Anderson, Simon P.
Foros, Øystein
Kind, Hans Jarle
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Anderson, Simon P.
  • Foros, Øystein
  • Kind, Hans Jarle
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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