Arbeitspapier

Globally incentives-compatible contracts under weak third party enforcement

We explore how the structure of incentives contracts adjusts to the creation of quasi-rents by the delivery of certain types of contract obligations under weak third party enforcement (TPE). The situation invites quasi-rent appropriation by some contractor. We focus on possible ex-post opportunism by the principal. We propose the concept of globally incentives compatible (GIC) contracts, where no contractor has the incentive to deviate ex-post from the obligations set ex-ante in the contract. We model optimal appropriation by the principal and the response of the agent when the contract is not GIC. The conditions that guarantee GIC for principal-agent the incentives contracts under weak TPE are investigated.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: UPSE Discussion Paper ; No. 2005,07

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
global incentives compatibility
quasi-rent
third party enforcement incentives contract
Vertragstheorie
Anreizvertrag
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fabella, Raul V.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE)
(where)
Quezon City
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fabella, Raul V.
  • University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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