Arbeitspapier

City Competition for the Creative Class

This paper explores the conditions under which decentralization and fiscal competition lead to a policy of subsidizing cultural activities. A theoretical analysis discusses these subsidies as a form of local public good provision which makes a city more attractive to highly educated individuals. The analysis shows that the incentive to provide the public good is particularly strong, if institutional restrictions prevent local governments from adjusting their tax structure. An empirical analysis considering the case of public theaters in Germany supports the view that public subsidies attract highly educated individuals and capitalize in the earnings of workers with basic education. Given institutional restrictions, the empirical effects suggest that local jurisdictions face a substantial fiscal incentive to subsidize cultural activities.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4417

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Public Goods
General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
Thema
fiscal competition
creative class
cultural amenities
theater subsidies
tax autonomy
capitalization
individual earnings

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Buettner, Thiess
Janeba, Eckhard
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Buettner, Thiess
  • Janeba, Eckhard
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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