Pork-barrel politics, discriminatory policies and fiscal federalism

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines the role of discriminatory policy tools in a model of redistributive politics with jurisdictional specific projects. In equilibrium, the ability to tactically target both jurisdictional specific projects, with benefits concentrated within a given jurisdiction, and the costs associated with those projects across multiple jurisdictions, leads to inefficiency in the provision of the “local” projects. In particular, politically motivated discrimination in the provision of local projects and/or their associated costs results in the foregoing of efficient projects. However, greater discriminatory ability in the set of available policies lowers the level of inefficiency in the provision of the local projects.

Object Details

• Alternative title: Kuhhandel in der Lokalpolitik und der fiskalische Föderalismus
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2006-15

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Fiscal Federalism ; redistributive politics ; distributive politics ; Colonel Blotto

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Roberson, Brian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51144
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET