Artikel

Control Preference and Financial Attributes: Founders as CEOs in Small, Publicly Traded Firms

Existing theories of the firm are silent with respect to cross-sectional differences in performance or characteristics of firms attributable to different types of managers. We hypothesize that the investment, financing and dividend decisions of founders differ systematically from those of nonfounder managers as a result of 1) founders valuing control more highly than do nonfounders, a condition we refer to as the control retention effect, and 2) founders being associated with younger, faster growing firms, a condition we label the life cycle effect. Our findings are that both effects are at work, but in different decision areas. No evidence is found that founders exploit their status to extract higher direct compensation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Journal of Small Business Finance ; ISSN: 1057-2287 ; Volume: 3 ; Year: 1993 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 43-62 ; Greenwich, CT: JAI Press

Classification
Management
Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Subject
Control Preference
Founder
CEO
Small Firm
Publicly Traded

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lane, William R.
Jameson, Mel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
JAI Press
(where)
Greenwich, CT
(when)
1993

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Lane, William R.
  • Jameson, Mel
  • JAI Press

Time of origin

  • 1993

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