Arbeitspapier
Consumer Exploitation and Notice Periods
Firms often set long notice periods when consumers cancel a contract, and sometimes do so even when the costs of changing or canceling the contract are small. We investigate a model in which a firm offers a contract to consumers who may procrastinate canceling it due to naive present-bias. We show that the firm may set a long notice period to exploit naive consumers.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 109
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation
Consumer Protection
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Economics of Regulation
- Subject
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notice periods
procrastination
present bias
time inconsistency
consumer naivete
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Murooka, Takeshi
Schwarz, Marco
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (where)
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München und Berlin
- (when)
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2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Murooka, Takeshi
- Schwarz, Marco
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Time of origin
- 2018