Arbeitspapier

Consumer Exploitation and Notice Periods

Firms often set long notice periods when consumers cancel a contract, and sometimes do so even when the costs of changing or canceling the contract are small. We investigate a model in which a firm offers a contract to consumers who may procrastinate canceling it due to naive present-bias. We show that the firm may set a long notice period to exploit naive consumers.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 109

Classification
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation
Consumer Protection
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Economics of Regulation
Subject
notice periods
procrastination
present bias
time inconsistency
consumer naivete

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Murooka, Takeshi
Schwarz, Marco
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
(where)
München und Berlin
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Murooka, Takeshi
  • Schwarz, Marco
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition

Time of origin

  • 2018

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