Lobbying in Europe: New firm-level evidence

Arbeitspapier

Lobbying can provide policy makers with important sector-specific information and thereby facilitating informed decisions. If going far beyond this, in particular if successfully influencing policy makers to unnecessarily tighten regulation or not opening already excessively regulated markets, it could potentially reduce overall economic welfare. We create a unique firm-level database on EU lobby activity and firm characteristics. We tend to find that firms in more protected sector, e.g. firms from non-tradable or higher regulated sectors tend to spend more for lobby activities. Also such firms tend to have higher profit margins and lower productivity, as often the case in sheltered sectors.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-92-899-2793-2
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 2071

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Technological Change: Government Policy
• Subject: lobbying ; regulation ; political economy

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dellis, Konstantinos ; Sondermann, David
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): European Central Bank (ECB)
• (where): Frankfurt a. M.
• (when): 2017

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.2866/831953
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175695
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET