Artikel
Patents as Collateral
This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents on investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour of innovative firms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities in R&D. High growth rates of innovations, possibly higher than the real rate of interest, may be achieved despite financial constraints. There is an optimal level of publicly funded policy by the patent and trademark office that minimizes the legal uncertainty surrounding patents as collateral and maximizes the growth rate of innovations.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control ; ISSN: 0165-1889 ; Volume: 34 ; Year: 2010-03-16 ; Issue: 6 ; Pages: 1094-1104 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Patents
Collateral
Growth
Innovation
Research and Development
Credit rationing
Patent
Collateral (Security)
Growth theory
Innovation
Research
Credit rationing
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Chatelain, Jean-Bernard
Ralf, Kirsten
Amable, Bruno
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Elsevier
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Amsterdam
- (when)
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2010-03-16
- DOI
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doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2010.03.004
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Chatelain, Jean-Bernard
- Ralf, Kirsten
- Amable, Bruno
- Elsevier
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 2010-03-16