Arbeitspapier
Public education, accountability, and yardstick competition in a federal system
Against the backdrop of a growing national and international accountability movement in education outcomes, this study sets up a simple model of yardstick competition with incumbent-disciplining effects through voters comparing performance measures of public education both across nations and federal states. It implies a potential strategic dilemma where a single top-performance state can block reform measures that could benefit low-performance states more than would do for itself. The linchpin predictions of the model are tested by analyzing announcement effects of student achievement tests on vote and popularity (VP) functions of German national and state government incumbents.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 138
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Education: Government Policy
- Subject
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yardstick competition
public education
VP-functions
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Mandel, Philipp
Süßmuth, Bernd
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- (where)
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Leipzig
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mandel, Philipp
- Süßmuth, Bernd
- Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Time of origin
- 2015