Arbeitspapier
Public education, accountability, and yardstick competition in a federal system
Against the backdrop of a growing national and international accountability movement in education outcomes, this study sets up a simple model of yardstick competition with incumbent-disciplining effects through voters comparing performance measures of public education both across nations and federal states. It implies a potential strategic dilemma where a single top-performance state can block reform measures that could benefit low-performance states more than would do for itself. The linchpin predictions of the model are tested by analyzing announcement effects of student achievement tests on vote and popularity (VP) functions of German national and state government incumbents.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 138
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Education: Government Policy
- Thema
-
yardstick competition
public education
VP-functions
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mandel, Philipp
Süßmuth, Bernd
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- (wo)
-
Leipzig
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mandel, Philipp
- Süßmuth, Bernd
- Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Entstanden
- 2015