Arbeitspapier

Public education, accountability, and yardstick competition in a federal system

Against the backdrop of a growing national and international accountability movement in education outcomes, this study sets up a simple model of yardstick competition with incumbent-disciplining effects through voters comparing performance measures of public education both across nations and federal states. It implies a potential strategic dilemma where a single top-performance state can block reform measures that could benefit low-performance states more than would do for itself. The linchpin predictions of the model are tested by analyzing announcement effects of student achievement tests on vote and popularity (VP) functions of German national and state government incumbents.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 138

Classification
Wirtschaft
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Education: Government Policy
Subject
yardstick competition
public education
VP-functions

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Mandel, Philipp
Süßmuth, Bernd
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
(where)
Leipzig
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Mandel, Philipp
  • Süßmuth, Bernd
  • Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Time of origin

  • 2015

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