Arbeitspapier

Announcing is bad, delaying is worse: Another pitfall in well-intended climate policy

It is frequently observed that the implementation of green policies is delayed compared to the initial announcement. Considering a setting with a representative monopolist extracting a non-renewable resource, we demonstrate that announcing a green policy, but then delaying its implementation, is associated with a larger cumulative extraction at any point in time than announcing a late implementation of this policy at the outset.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3844

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Thema
climate policy
carbon taxation
Kyoto Protocol
optimal control
Klimaschutz
Ökosteuer
Ankündigungseffekt
Erschöpfbare Ressourcen
Kontrolltheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jus, Darko
Meier, Volker
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jus, Darko
  • Meier, Volker
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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