Arbeitspapier

Mutual fund transparency and corporate myopia

Pressure from institutional money managers to generate profits in the short run is often blamed for corporate myopia. Theoretical research suggests that money managers' short term focus stems from their career concerns and greater fund transparency can amplify these concerns. Using a difference-in-differences design around a regulatory shock that increased transparency about fund managers' portfolio choices, we examine whether increased transparency encourages myopic corporate investment behavior. We find that corporate innovation declines following the regulatory shock. Moreover, evidence from mutual fund trading behavior corroborates that these results are driven by increased short-term focus of money managers.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 16-10

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Investmentfonds
Fondsmanagement
Betriebliche Finanzwirtschaft
Portfolio-Management

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Agarwal, Vikas
Vashishtha, Rahul
Venkatachalam, Mohan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
(where)
Cologne
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Agarwal, Vikas
  • Vashishtha, Rahul
  • Venkatachalam, Mohan
  • University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Time of origin

  • 2017

Other Objects (12)