Arbeitspapier

Mutual fund transparency and corporate myopia

Pressure from institutional money managers to generate profits in the short run is often blamed for corporate myopia. Theoretical research suggests that money managers' short term focus stems from their career concerns and greater fund transparency can amplify these concerns. Using a difference-in-differences design around a regulatory shock that increased transparency about fund managers' portfolio choices, we examine whether increased transparency encourages myopic corporate investment behavior. We find that corporate innovation declines following the regulatory shock. Moreover, evidence from mutual fund trading behavior corroborates that these results are driven by increased short-term focus of money managers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 16-10

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Investmentfonds
Fondsmanagement
Betriebliche Finanzwirtschaft
Portfolio-Management

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Agarwal, Vikas
Vashishtha, Rahul
Venkatachalam, Mohan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
(wo)
Cologne
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Agarwal, Vikas
  • Vashishtha, Rahul
  • Venkatachalam, Mohan
  • University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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