Artikel
An empirical model of non-equilibrium behavior in games
This paper studies the identification and estimation of the decision rules that in- dividuals use to determine their actions in games, based on a structural econo- metric model of non-equilibrium behavior in games. The model is based pri- marily on various notions of limited strategic reasoning, allowing multiple modes of strategic reasoning and heterogeneity in strategic reasoning across individu- als and within individuals. The paper proposes the model and provides sufficient conditions for point identification of the model. Then the model is estimated on data from an experiment involving two-player guessing games. The application illustrates the empirical relevance of the main features of the model.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 141-181 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Econometrics of Games and Auctions
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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Games
heterogeneity
identification
non-equilibrium
strategic reasoning
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kline, Brendan
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2018
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/QE647
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Kline, Brendan
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2018