Artikel

An empirical model of non-equilibrium behavior in games

This paper studies the identification and estimation of the decision rules that in- dividuals use to determine their actions in games, based on a structural econo- metric model of non-equilibrium behavior in games. The model is based pri- marily on various notions of limited strategic reasoning, allowing multiple modes of strategic reasoning and heterogeneity in strategic reasoning across individu- als and within individuals. The paper proposes the model and provides sufficient conditions for point identification of the model. Then the model is estimated on data from an experiment involving two-player guessing games. The application illustrates the empirical relevance of the main features of the model.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 141-181 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Econometrics of Games and Auctions
Noncooperative Games
Subject
Games
heterogeneity
identification
non-equilibrium
strategic reasoning

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kline, Brendan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3982/QE647
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Kline, Brendan
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2018

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