Arbeitspapier

The digital economy, privacy, and CBDC

We study a model of financial intermediation, payment choice, and privacy in the digital economy. Cash preserves anonymity but cannot be used for more efficient online transactions. By contrast, bank deposits can be used online but do not preserve anonymity. Banks use the information contained in deposit flows to extract rents from merchants in need of financing. Payment tokens issued by digital platforms allow merchants to hide from banks but enable platforms to stifle competition. An independent digital payment instrument (a CBDC) that allows agents to share their payment data with selected parties can overcome all frictions and achieves the efficient allocation.

ISBN
978-92-899-5111-1
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 2662

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Central Banks and Their Policies
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Subject
Central Bank Digital Currency
Privacy
Payments
Digital Platforms
Financial Intermediation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ahnert, Toni
Hoffmann, Peter
Monnet, Cyril
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2022

DOI
doi:10.2866/284946
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ahnert, Toni
  • Hoffmann, Peter
  • Monnet, Cyril
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Time of origin

  • 2022

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