Arbeitspapier

Health insurance: Treatment vs. compensation

In this paper, we view health insurance as a combined hedge against the two consequences of falling ill: treatment expenditures and loss in income. We discuss how an individual’s ability when healthy affects her decision on whether to buy health insurance with treatment to full recovery if ill or with partial treatment combined with cash compensation for the resulting loss in income. We find that a high ability individual demands full recovery and is fully insured, while a low-ability individual demands partial treatment and cash compensation and is only partly insured.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2000,40

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Thema
Krankenversicherung
Versicherungsökonomik
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Asheim, Geir B.
Wenche Emblem, Anne
Nilssen, Tore
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Asheim, Geir B.
  • Wenche Emblem, Anne
  • Nilssen, Tore
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2000

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