Taxing Education in Ramsey's Tradition

Arbeitspapier

Assuming a two-period model with endogenous choices of labour, education, and saving, it is shown to be second-best efficient to deviate from Ramsey's Rule and to distort qualified labour less than nonqualified labour. Furthermore, if the earnings function displays constant elasticity, the choice of education should not be distorted. With the necessary qualifications the results extend to the case when taxpayers are heterogeneous and when the planner trades off efficiency against equity.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-86788-158-6
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 140

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Education: Government Policy ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
• Subject: Endogenous choice of education, labour, and saving ; second-best efficient taxation ; linear instruments ; finite periods ; Ramsey's Rule ; Power Law of Learning ; Bildungsverhalten ; Arbeitsangebot ; Sparen ; Optimale Besteuerung ; Lernprozess ; Bildungsökonomik ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Richter, Wolfram F.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
• (where): Essen
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29943
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET