Artikel

Speech is silver, silence is golden

This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 497-507 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
free-riding
communication
coordination

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Andersson, Ola
Holm, Hakan J.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2013

DOI
doi:10.3390/g4030497
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Andersson, Ola
  • Holm, Hakan J.
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2013

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