Upstream Competition and Open Access Regimes: Experimental Evidence

Konferenzbeitrag

We investigate the effects of alternative open access regimes on market performance. In particular, by means of an economic laboratory experiment we compare the market outcomes under unregulated wholesale competition, under a price-fixing rule (where firms must maintain their wholesale price for a fixed period of time), and under a margin squeeze rule (where the retail price of integrated firms must exceed their wholesale price). Our analysis suggests that wholesale and retail prices are substantially reduced by the introduction of a price-fixing rule at the upstream level compared to the unregulated scenario. In contrast, we do not find evidence that a margin squeeze regulation reduces retail market prices. In fact, while such a rule benefits the reselling firm by allowing for a viable profit margin, prices for consumers tend to be even higher than in the unregulated case.

Objekt anzeigen

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: 26th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "What Next for European Telecommunications?", Madrid, Spain, 24th-27th June, 2015

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Economics of Regulation ; Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities: General
• Thema: Next Generation Access Networks ; Access Regulation ; Open Access ; Upstream Competition ; Experimental Economics ; Margin Squeeze

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Horstmann, Niklas ; Krämer, Jan ; Schnurr, Daniel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
• (wo): Calgary
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127149