Arbeitspapier

Physician Payment Mechanisms, Hospital Length of Stay and Risk of Readmission: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

We provide an analysis of the effect of physician payment methods on their hospital patients' length of stay and risk of readmission. To do so, we exploit a major reform implemented in Quebec (Canada) in 1999. The Quebec Government introduced an optional mixed compensation (MC) scheme for specialist physicians working in hospital. This scheme combines a fixed per diem with a reduced fee for services provided, as an alternative to the traditional fee-for- service system. We develop a model of a physician's decision to choose the MC scheme. We show that a physician who adopts this system will have incentives to increase his time per clinical service provided. We demonstrate that as long as this effect does not improve his patients' health by more than a critical level, they will stay more days in hospital over the period. At the empirical level, we estimate a model of transition between spells in and out of hospital analog to a difference-in-differences approach. We find that the hospital length of stay of patients treated in departments that opted for the MC system increased on average by 5.3% (0.35 days). However, the risk of readmission to the same department with the same diagnosis does not appear to be overall affected by the reform.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7835

Classification
Wirtschaft
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Health: General
Health Behavior
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
Subject
physician payment mechanisms
mixed compensation
hospital length of stay
risk of re-hospitalisation
duration model
natural experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Échevin, Damien
Fortin, Bernard
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Échevin, Damien
  • Fortin, Bernard
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2013

Other Objects (12)