Arbeitspapier

Robust policy schemes for R&D games with asymmetric information

We consider an abstract setting of the differential r&d game, where participating firms are allowed for strategic behavior. We assume the information asymmetry across those firms and the government, which seeks to support newer technologies in a socially optimal manner. We develop a general theory of robust subsidies under such one-sided uncertainty and establish results on relative optimality, duration and size of different policy tools available to the government. It turns out that there might exist multiple sets of second-best robust policies, but there always exist a naturally induced ordering across such sets, implying the optimal choice of a policy exists for the government under different uncertainty levels.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WWZ Working Paper ; No. 2017/14

Classification
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Technological Change: Government Policy
Subject
technology lock-in
technological change
strategic interaction
uncertainty
robust policy sets
uncertainty thresholds
robust welfare improving policy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bondarev, Anton
Krysiak, Frank C.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
(where)
Basel
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bondarev, Anton
  • Krysiak, Frank C.
  • University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)

Time of origin

  • 2017

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