Robust policy schemes for R&D games with asymmetric information

Arbeitspapier

We consider an abstract setting of the differential r&d game, where participating firms are allowed for strategic behavior. We assume the information asymmetry across those firms and the government, which seeks to support newer technologies in a socially optimal manner. We develop a general theory of robust subsidies under such one-sided uncertainty and establish results on relative optimality, duration and size of different policy tools available to the government. It turns out that there might exist multiple sets of second-best robust policies, but there always exist a naturally induced ordering across such sets, implying the optimal choice of a policy exists for the government under different uncertainty levels.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WWZ Working Paper ; No. 2017/14

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Technological Change: Government Policy
• Thema: technology lock-in ; technological change ; strategic interaction ; uncertainty ; robust policy sets ; uncertainty thresholds ; robust welfare improving policy

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bondarev, Anton ; Krysiak, Frank C.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185834
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ