Arbeitspapier

Robust policy schemes for R&D games with asymmetric information

We consider an abstract setting of the differential r&d game, where participating firms are allowed for strategic behavior. We assume the information asymmetry across those firms and the government, which seeks to support newer technologies in a socially optimal manner. We develop a general theory of robust subsidies under such one-sided uncertainty and establish results on relative optimality, duration and size of different policy tools available to the government. It turns out that there might exist multiple sets of second-best robust policies, but there always exist a naturally induced ordering across such sets, implying the optimal choice of a policy exists for the government under different uncertainty levels.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WWZ Working Paper ; No. 2017/14

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Technological Change: Government Policy
Thema
technology lock-in
technological change
strategic interaction
uncertainty
robust policy sets
uncertainty thresholds
robust welfare improving policy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bondarev, Anton
Krysiak, Frank C.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bondarev, Anton
  • Krysiak, Frank C.
  • University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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