Arbeitspapier
Robust policy schemes for R&D games with asymmetric information
We consider an abstract setting of the differential r&d game, where participating firms are allowed for strategic behavior. We assume the information asymmetry across those firms and the government, which seeks to support newer technologies in a socially optimal manner. We develop a general theory of robust subsidies under such one-sided uncertainty and establish results on relative optimality, duration and size of different policy tools available to the government. It turns out that there might exist multiple sets of second-best robust policies, but there always exist a naturally induced ordering across such sets, implying the optimal choice of a policy exists for the government under different uncertainty levels.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: WWZ Working Paper ; No. 2017/14
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Technological Change: Government Policy
- Thema
-
technology lock-in
technological change
strategic interaction
uncertainty
robust policy sets
uncertainty thresholds
robust welfare improving policy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bondarev, Anton
Krysiak, Frank C.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
- (wo)
-
Basel
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bondarev, Anton
- Krysiak, Frank C.
- University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
Entstanden
- 2017