Robust policy schemes for R&D games with asymmetric information

Arbeitspapier

We consider an abstract setting of the differential r&d game, where participating firms are allowed for strategic behavior. We assume the information asymmetry across those firms and the government, which seeks to support newer technologies in a socially optimal manner. We develop a general theory of robust subsidies under such one-sided uncertainty and establish results on relative optimality, duration and size of different policy tools available to the government. It turns out that there might exist multiple sets of second-best robust policies, but there always exist a naturally induced ordering across such sets, implying the optimal choice of a policy exists for the government under different uncertainty levels.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WWZ Working Paper ; No. 2017/14

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Technological Change: Government Policy
• Subject: technology lock-in ; technological change ; strategic interaction ; uncertainty ; robust policy sets ; uncertainty thresholds ; robust welfare improving policy

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bondarev, Anton ; Krysiak, Frank C.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185834
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET