Arbeitspapier
Optimal Forest Taxation under Private and Social Amenity Valuation
This paper analyzes socially optimal forest taxation when the government has a binding tax revenue requirement. In the Faustmann model the optimal design of forest taxation consists of non-distortionary taxes, such as site productivity tax, site value tax or profit tax. A combination of distortionary unit (or yield) tax and timber tax can also be used to collect the tax revenue in a non-distortionary way. In the Hartman model with amenity services as a public good, the optimal design consists of a non-distortionary tax and a Pigouvian tax, which adjusts the private rotation age to the socially optimal one. Now only the site productivity tax is non-distortionary, while unit, yield, timber, site value and profit taxes generally serve as a corrective Pigouvian taxes. In the absence of a non-distortionary tax, a combination of unit (or yield) and timber taxes can often be used to both tax revenue collection and Pigouvian correction.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 409
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Rotation age
forest amenities
optimal forest taxation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Koskela, Erkki
Ollikainen, Markku
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Koskela, Erkki
- Ollikainen, Markku
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2001
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