The importance of knowing your own reputation

Arbeitspapier

We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning of the next period, participants are re-matched and, except for the two control treatments, receive information resulting from the previous period's evaluations. There are three information treatments: Participants receive information either about their own evaluation or about their partner's evaluation or both. Although participants condition their contributions on their partners' evaluations, this information alone is insufficient to raise contributions. Only if participants also know their own evaluation, we do find a significant increase in contributions relative to the control treatments.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 36-2012

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Conditional Cooperation ; Evaluation ; Public Good Games ; Prisoner's Dilemma ; Repeated games with varying partners ; Reputation ; Second-order beliefs ; Öffentliches Gut ; Wiederholte Spiele ; Gefangenendilemma ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Greiff, Matthias ; Paetzel, Fabian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
• (where): Marburg
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73092
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET