Playing with the good guys: A public good game with endogenous group formation

Arbeitspapier

In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start of high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will selfselect into groups committed to charitable giving. Testing this experimentally, we let subjects choose between two group types, where one type donate a fixed amount to a charity. Contributions in these groups stayed high, whereas contributions in the other groups showed the well known declining pattern. One implication is that corporate social responsibility may attract more responsible employees.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Memorandum ; No. 2009,08

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Consumer Economics: Theory ; Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers ; Public Goods
• Thema: Altruism ; conditional cooperation ; self-selection ; Öffentliches Gut ; Spieltheorie ; Altruismus ; Corporate Social Responsibility ; Konsumentenverhalten ; Test

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Brekke, Kjell Arne ; Hauge, Karen Evelyn ; Lind, Jo Thori ; Nyborg, Karine
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (wo): Oslo
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47311
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ